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Abstract
In this study the author builds on previous materials and a statistical comparison 
between states with successful coup attempts and states without successful coups 
in an attempt to isolate a series of factors that may have an effect on the outcome 
of an attempted coup d'état. The isolated factors are then tested on the cases of 
Gambia, Ghana, Ecuador and Thailand. 
The five factors  that  resulted  from this  study and should be present  in  all 
countries  with  successful  coups  are:  Low  level  of  internationalisation  and 
international  interest,  Economical  instability  and  widespread  poverty,  often 
coupled with accusations of corruption, as well as a rurally or raw materials based 
production, Undereducated and largely illiterate population with a generally low 
status  and  ethnic  clashes  between  themselves,  Culturally  and  historically  an 
authoritarian tradition, Incentives for the army or some other elite to attempt to 
seize power via a coup. 
The situation of support on the domestic arena and disinterest internationally 
is created by an interaction between all of the factors, and leads to a much higher 
success rate of the attempted coups.
Keywords: Coup, Support, Authoritarianism, Opinion, Democracy
David Runbäck
Table of Contents
1  Introduction                                                                                                         .......................................................................................................1  
1.1  Research Problem and Purpose                                                                       .....................................................................1  
1.2  Theory and Methodology                                                                                ..............................................................................2  
1.2.1  Selecting the Cases                                                                                   .................................................................................2  
1.2.2  Definitions of the Key Concepts                                                              ............................................................3  
1.2.3  Disposition                                                                                               .............................................................................................3  
2  Where Does Authoritarianism Find Support?                                                  ................................................4  
2.1  The Importance of International Reactions                                                     ...................................................4  
2.1.1  International Repression of Coups                                                           .........................................................4  
2.1.2  International Support of Coups                                                                ..............................................................5  
2.2  Economy and the Salvation From Misery                                                       .....................................................6  
2.2.1  Poverty and Corruption                                                                            ..........................................................................7  
2.2.2  The Importance of Instability                                                                   .................................................................7  
2.3  The “Antidemocratic Personality”                                                                  ................................................................8  
2.4  The Authoritarian Legacies of Religion and Culture                                      ....................................9  
2.4.1  Post-Colonial Issues                                                                               .............................................................................10  
2.4.2  The Overrepresentation of Africa                                                          ........................................................10  
2.5  Incentives For Coups According to Game Theory                                      ....................................11  
2.5.1  The Filter of Plausibility                                                                        ......................................................................11  
2.5.2  Individual Incentives                                                                              ............................................................................12  
3  Overview of Some Selected Cases                                                                     ...................................................................13  
3.1  The Gambia 1994, Popularity Lasting to This Day                                      ....................................13  
3.1.1  History and Background                                                                        ......................................................................13  
3.1.2  Economy                                                                                                ..............................................................................................14  
3.1.3  Geopolitical Context                                                                              ............................................................................14  
3.2  Ghana 1966, False Claims and Foreign Interests                                          ........................................15  
3.2.1  History and Background                                                                        ......................................................................15  
3.2.2  Economy                                                                                                ..............................................................................................15  
3.2.3  Geopolitical Context                                                                              ............................................................................16  
3.3  Ecuador 2000, Strong Population and Soft Army                                         .......................................16  
3.3.1  History and Background                                                                        ......................................................................16  
3.3.2  Economy                                                                                                ..............................................................................................17  
3.3.3  Geopolitical Context                                                                              ............................................................................17  
3.4  Thailand 1991, Coups Under the Great King                                                ..............................................18  
David Runbäck
3.4.1  History and Background                                                                        ......................................................................18  
3.4.2  Economy                                                                                                ..............................................................................................19  
3.4.3  Geopolitical Context                                                                              ............................................................................19  
4  Conclusions                                                                                                         .......................................................................................................20  
4.1 Common Features in the Cases                                                                      ....................................................................21  
4.1.1  Authoritarian Traditions and Domestic Support                                    ..................................21  
4.1.2  Unrest in the Region and In the Population                                           .........................................22  
4.1.3  Ethnic Heterogeneity                                                                              ............................................................................22  
4.1.4  Poor Economic Situation                                                                        ......................................................................23  
4.2  The Factors and Their Impact                                                                       .....................................................................23  
 References                                                                                                             ............................................................................................................24  
 Appendix 1: Statistical Comparison Between States With Successful Coups 
and World Averages                                                                                              ............................................................................................26  
 Method and Selection of Cases                                                                          .........................................................................26  
 List of the States With Successful Coups Included                                       ......................................27  
 Statistical Averages For States With Successful Coups                                    ...................................27  
 Statistical Averages For All States                                                                    ...................................................................28  
 Significant Differences                                                                                       ......................................................................................29  
 Appendix 2: Application on a Fresh Case; Guinea                                           ..........................................30  
 The Coup Attempt                                                                                          .........................................................................................30  
 The Factors and How They Manifest Themselves                                         ........................................30  
 Conclusion                                                                                                      .....................................................................................................31  
David Runbäck
1 Introduction 
In this study I will focus the factors making an attempt at takeover via the means 
of  a  coup  fail  or  succeed.  The  answer  to  why  coups  succeed  is  of  course 
complicated, and I make no illusions that I have found a definite answer to hand 
over as a godsend gift to the coup makers of the world, or their opponents for that 
matter. Further research is always needed, but my attempt is to narrow down the 
possible answers to a few and clearly distinguishable factors in the society where 
a coup attempt takes place. Where these are present the coup makers seemingly 
enjoy a greater chance of success.
Juan Linz has already explained that a superficial analysis suggesting that it is 
the  absence of  conditions  making  democracy  possible  that  leads  to  the 
establishment of authoritarianism does not hold up to realistic inspection, many 
cases of nondemocratic regimes have appeared in countries that  should have a 
high probability for democracy (Linz 2000, p. 137-140). The study of why an 
attempted  coup  succeeds  or  fails  needs  a  different  approach.  Breakdown  of 
democracy is not identical with the establishment of authoritarian rule, nor is it a 
prerequisite  of such (ibid p.  138).  In the fast  workings of a coup there might 
sometimes be an institutionalized democracy falling for the superior might of its 
military  under  an  authoritarian  commander,  a  commander  that  the  population 
often like and support for a variety of reasons, these reasons will be the main 
focus of this study.
It is important to point out here that no totalitarian or authoritarian systems 
have yet been overthrown by internal force, however many have transferred into 
weaker and more democratic systems that were then ultimately replaced (ibid. p. 
139). Many authoritarian systems have experienced attempted coups which they 
have struck down, showing that a successful coup is a sign of a weak state that 
strong forces within the army or similar institutions see as “up for grabs”.
1.1 Research Problem and Purpose
The specific question addressed in this study is: which factors need to be present  
in a country to create an atmosphere that facilitates a successful Coup d'état and  
the establishment of authoritarian rule?
The purpose of this study is to either confirm or disprove the theory of pre-
existing conditions being the determining factor in the outcome of a coup attempt, 
and to define more specifically the nature of these conditions to be able to better 
understand how these conditions can be used to prevent authoritarian takeovers. It 
is not my purpose to explain the exact workings behind the coup itself, nor is this 
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an attempt to study the de facto regimes that are the outcome of the coup. Both of 
these  are  however  crucial  for  the  understanding  of  the  factors  creating  the 
outcome.  I  will  focus  on  the  absence  or  presence  of   the  theoretical  factors 
allowing the new regime to evolve into a stable authoritarian rule.
1.2 Theory and Methodology
There are three possible outcomes to a coup attempt. Either the coup leader takes 
power to create a new leadership, or the status quo government remains, or a civil 
war breaks out (Sutter 2000, p. 208). Since civil wars can in some cases last for 
decades and evolve into conflicts between completely different factions than the 
ones involved in the initial coup I have decided to limit this study to the cases 
where either the first or second possible outcome occur within a year of the initial 
coup attempt.  
The theory tested is that in the states where coups take place you can find a set 
of pre-existing conditions for a transition to authoritarianism, in other states these 
conditions are absent. If the pre-existing conditions are a foundation to continued 
authoritarian rule the first outcome will occur and a new leadership will be set up, 
authoritarian if the coup leaders have such intentions. If the conditions are absent 
the second outcome will occur and the status quo remain. This theory is supported 
by the fact that until the mid 1980s coups were widespread in a large part of the 
underdeveloped world (also defined  as  the third world,  the south,  or the non-
western world), since then it has become an almost exclusively African problem 
(McGowan 2003, p.  340f).  This  can be interpreted  to signify a change of the 
underlying conditions for coups in the rest of the world, but not in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It  is  also important  to  note that  in  most  of countries  where successful 
coups  have  occurred  there  has  also  been  failed  coups  (ibid  p.  346).  This  is 
interpreted as a sign that coup attempts have a small window of opportunity where 
the conditions are right to succeed, and if this “window” is missed there is no 
longer any strong foundations to establish a new leadership, and subsequent coup 
attempts fail.
1.2.1 Selecting the Cases
Almost all coup attempts take place in the developing regions of the world, south 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these regions of the world the flow of free 
information  is  poor  at  best,  limiting  my  access  to  statistics  and  independent 
studies,  and  leading  to  a  weak  first  hand  material  which  must  be  taken  into 
account. There are few coups that establish left wing or socialist rule, as further 
discussed in chapter  two these tend to be the result  of  revolutions  rather  than 
coups, leading to an over representation of right wing dictatorships. For purposes 
of clarity I have excluded the cases in which it is clear that the coup is made with 
the explicit purpose to establish democratic power.
2
David Runbäck
I have found it necessary to restrict the cases mentioned in detail due to the 
lack of previous research and source materials about coups outside the region of 
sub-Saharan Africa. The material and numbers such as statistics used for the cases 
are as close as possible to the time of the coup being studied, however in some 
cases these numbers are separated from the year of the coup attempt by a few 
years.
1.2.2 Definitions of the Key Concepts
• Linz  divides  undemocratic  systems  into  totalitarian  and authoritarian.  I  have 
chosen to not make this division, instead using the term authoritarian to describe 
any kind of ruler that  is not elected democratically and/or uses undemocratic 
means to govern. Meaning that all regimes that are formed by coups are de facto 
authoritarian until  they either  transform into democratic  regimes by allowing 
elections, step down in favor of a democratically elected leader, or are replaced 
by a counteraction from the previous rulers. 
• A  coup,  unlike  a  revolution,  is  not  achieved  by  a  large  amount  of  people 
working together for a political goal, but rather by a small elite wishing to rule 
over  the  masses.  As  such  a  coup  attempt  in  itself  represents  a  kind  of 
authoritarian “mentality”. My definition of coup is for this purpose shared with 
McGowan  “[The  coup]  can  install  a  military,  or  an  alternative  civilian 
government. It can maintain, or change, social policy. In its essence the coup is a 
lightning action at the top, in which violence is the ultimate determinant, even if 
it is not used. [...] [E]xisting regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced by the 
action of a relatively small group, in which members of the military, police or 
security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in conjunction 
with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs” (McGowan 
2003, pp 342-344).
1.2.3 Disposition
I will begin by in chapter 2 determine a set of factors that influence the support of 
authoritarianism, beginning on the international and then lowering to the national 
and  finally  personal  levels,  focusing  on  the  economical  and  cultural  factors 
involved in the individual decision to support authoritarian leaderships. I will give 
a  brief  overview  and  description  of  the  so  called  antidemocratic  personality, 
which connects with an unstable national situation to form incitements for coup 
makers to participate in a coup. In chapters 3 and 4 four cases will be examined 
with regard to the theoretical factors developed in chapter 2. Finally in chapter 5 I 
will  summarise  with  my conclusions.  Appendix  1 is  a  purely statistical  study 
aimed at aiding the study with factual numbers. Appendix 2 gives an overview of 
the at the time of writing still ongoing coup in Guinea. 
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2 Where Does Authoritarianism Find 
Support?
Any leader,  regardless  of the  means  used to  assume power,  needs  to enjoy a 
certain  minimal  level  of  support,  not  least  within  his  own  lines  and  power 
apparatus, in order to not be immediately overthrown. In some cases this support 
comes  in  the  form of  a  lack  of  resistance  (or  apathy),  in  others  the  fear  of 
repercussions, international allies or, as in the case of Thailand recently, outright 
popularity fuel the non-negative reactions. In many cases the people of a country 
are for differing reasons ready for a change, and will welcome a new rule without 
scrutinising its nature. Nearly all successful coup attempts takes place in a place 
and  time  of  major  political  and  economical  turmoil.  In  such  situations  the 
population more often than not has more pressing things like starvation at their 
hands,  and  other  factors  that  will  prevent  active  opposition.  Due  to  modern 
communications it is not uncommon for international reactions to begin the same 
day of the coup, making the international community into a possible tool to skew 
the outcome of the attempt.
2.1 The Importance of International Reactions
It  is  nearly  impossible  for  a  coup  attempt  and  completely  impossible  for  a 
successful coup to be without any effect  on the relations with foreign nations, 
especially in the current international political climate where democratic elections 
is the only approved way to change a democratically elected rule. For this same 
reason it is also easier to gain domestic than international support for a coup. In 
most cases the reactions from foreign nations will be condemnation and sanctions 
directed as incentives to re-establish democracy. The support or opposition of a 
powerful world power can have a significant impact on the outcome of the coup 
attempt, and so one of the most important things coup leaders need to consider is 
how, and from where, they will gain their support.
2.1.1 International Repression of Coups
An important part of history for many countries is their traditional ties to parts of 
the western  world  through spheres  of  interest.  These  are  often  created  by the 
colonisers  of  the  region  by  leaving  behind  their  language,  legal  systems  and 
cultural legacies as well as establishing companies and trade routes still in force 
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today.  These  legacies  can  be used to  preserve  the  interests  of  the  west  of  an 
atmosphere  of  stability  and  democracy.  One  such  example  can  be  found  in 
Northwest Africa where for many years the French government kept their spheres 
of interests stable by guaranteeing civilian governments in the former colonies the 
support of the French army, which no native military force could measure itself 
against (Clark 2007 p. 142). In other parts the British-supported Kenyan model of 
buying off the army with material benefits seems to work well to stop anyone 
from trying to take over power by force (ibid.). This type of stabilising means 
taken by foreign states can be very effective to hinder coup attempts, and may 
keep entire regions free from coup attempts (see McGowan 2003 p. 356). 
Even  with  a  coup  already  in  process  an  undesired  reaction  from  the 
international  surroundings  can  cause  the  coup  leaders  to  react  in  ways  that 
ultimately affect  the outcome of the coup. One example from my cases is  the 
condemnation  of  the Gambian  coup which led  to a  near  complete  stop in  the 
tourist  industry  and  other  important  economical  sources,  leading  in  turn  to  a 
“transition to civilian rule” of the regime with the coup leader installing himself as 
president, a turn that otherwise might not have happened and which was a key 
part in the consolidation and acceptance of the new regime amongst its citizens 
(Saine 2008 p. 62).
2.1.2 International Support of Coups
At times the coup leader might gain the support of a foreign power to fight against 
a  “common  enemy”.  This  was  more  common  during  the  cold  war  with  the 
American  intervention  in  Chile  1973  as  one  of  many  examples.  During  the 
Portuguese colonial war of the early 1970's the Soviet Union and Sudan as well as 
many in the population supported the MPLA in Angola despite its open intentions 
of establishing a one-party state (Wright 1997 pp. 9-10). Sudan still supported the 
party in semantics and materially long after the fall of the soviet union and until at 
least 1997, despite Sudan itself not being a communist nation (ibid.). In both these 
cases and many more it was the international support that ultimately led to the 
success of the coup, thereby not said that the native population did not play a role 
by in part supporting the new leaderships being installed. 
In the geopolitical situation of the 21st century this kind of direct  actions of 
support for coups in other sovereign nations seems to have played out their role 
and been replaced by direct interventions from the countries themselves, such as 
in Iraq or South Ossetia, and the covert support of coups has seemingly played out 
its  role  amongst  the larger  and more  powerful  nations to  favour an agenda of 
spreading democracy rather than blind support for right- or left wing authoritarian 
takeovers. In a smaller and more regional context however the practice remains 
relatively widespread, with for example China, Venezuela and Bolivia stepping in 
with support  for like-minded leftist  revolutionary groups seeking power in the 
nearby area, or alternatively supported like-minded governments against the same 
kind of groups1. 
1For an example of Venezuela see  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=9 (20081215)
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2.2 Economy and the Salvation From Misery
No  state,  authoritarian  or  otherwise,  can  stand  outside  of  the  globalised 
economical system of today. As authoritarian regimes by their nature impose laws 
strongly regulating national activities, especially political activity, this will have 
an effect on the economical institutions in the country as well. The specific factors 
effecting how growth progresses over time vary strongly from case to case, but 
foreign  investors  and  multinational  companies  are  often  “scared  off”  by 
authoritarian takeovers and the new order they often bring to the country. Thus, 
newly  authoritarian  states  must  gain  the  support  of  the  international  financial 
community,  and  with  that  comes  the  trust  of  the  population,  by  providing 
somewhat stable conditions for economical institutions.
The economy of the states with coup activity often rely on export of tangible 
goods and agriculture2, as is common in the developing world where the majority 
of the coup attempts take place.  In some cases there is few or no independent 
capitalist businesses, but in others mining companies and the like have enormous 
resources  and  power  over  the  working  population.  These  domestic  businesses 
often support authoritarian regimes because the other options would mean less 
economical freedom, or more regulation of wages etc. that would mean less profit 
(Greenwood 2008 pp. 837, 840-843). Greenwood studied the subject using the 
cases of south America and the Arab world, coming to the perhaps unsurprising 
conclusion that businesses support the best option for themselves and their profit, 
which in many cases, especially where the business is labour intense and needs 
workers that do not complain or have the right to organize, is authoritarianism 
(ibid. pp. 837, 856, passim.). In places where foreign businesses are rare with the 
possible exception of investments from the former colonial powers the question 
instead  becomes  how a  coup  will  affect  the  export  of  raw materials  and  the 
prospects of investments in the future, in these cases sanctions are crucial, and can 
be used as a tool to turn domestic opinion against the foreign investors.
For the countries where a large amount of the production facilities belong to 
foreign companies or owners, often from a former colonial power in the country 
itself or in a nearby country who has had impact on the region, it is easy to blame 
economical hardships and poverty on foreign interests. During the cold war blame 
was placed on “the communists” or “the capitalists”.  Now it is far more often 
blamed  on  the  more  diffuse  “the  west”.  Apart  from  the  occasional  racist  or 
religious  usage  of  minority  groups  as  scapegoat  which  is  the  cause  of  the 
problems (such as in Rwanda) former colonial powers or other western interests, 
together with accusations of corruption in the ruling government, are by far the 
most popular powers to blame for poverty and lack of standard of living, often 
giving support to the coup plotters where the population sees such allegations as 
justified. 
2See appendix 1
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2.2.1 Poverty and Corruption
Poverty and the dependence on one or a few goods for a very large portion of the 
national income is widespread in the parts of the world where coups are the most 
frequent (see appendix 1). 
As McGowan points out with the example of Ivory Coast (2003 pp. 365-367) 
the sudden fall of world prices of any goods that a small,  otherwise poor state 
relies  on for export  will  lead to increased poverty and in turn often to revolt, 
unrest and protests amongst the population. While these countries often get aid 
from international organisations extreme and overt corruption often decimate the 
share reaching to population to near nothing.  This often leads to a sharp rise in 
the public support for any new leaders promising change and better conditions. 
The absence of coup attempts in some of the worlds poorest countries shows 
that poverty in itself is not a factor for coups to occur and be successful (ibid.). 
However, in combination with other factors poverty may pose an incitement for 
the population  to welcome a change in leadership,  if  this  desire  for change is 
coupled  with  factors  that  encourage  democracy  coups  are  unlikely.  In  the 
countries  where  coups  do  occur  there  is  often  an  absence  of  “democratic-
mindedness” in the population that weakens the distinction between democracy or 
authoritarianism as the good or bad option respectively.
2.2.2 The Importance of Instability
Instability is a common factor in countries that experience coup attempts, but why 
is  instability  a  factor?  Perhaps  a  better  question  would be  why  stability is  so 
important, because coup attempts do indeed, although more rarely, occur in some 
stable and well established countries. The question at hand is what makes coups 
succeed, and here instability of the current system is a crucial factor. 
Most  coup  makers  in  their  decrees3 pointed  to  widespread  corruption, 
inefficiency or misuse of power from the previous rulers as the reason for their 
coup  attempts  and  excuse  for  the  subsequent  takeovers  (Clark  2007  p.  141). 
Therefore it would seem that absence of corruption, inefficiency and power abuse 
deters from successful coups, but not necessarily from the  attempts. As we will 
see the difference is small but crucial,  and depends largely on the decisions of 
individual coup makers. This approach is however very simplified.
Instability  is  often  also  strengthened by a  heterogeneous  population  where 
ethnic, cultural or religious clashes can flare up into violence, and there is often 
bickering about the mechanics of power sharing between different ethnic groups. 
In this situation an authoritarian rule can often work to quiet down the clashes, or 
at  least  the  violence.  While  people  may vote  for  their  preferred  ethnic  group, 
many seem to have an easier time to support a non-elected leader of a different 
ethnic group.
The widespread chaos in the first decades after independence the basic order 
provided  by  the  abandoning  colonisers  set  the  stage  for  the  actors  to,  after 
3See appendix 2 for the recent example of Guinea
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independence, promise to bring back law, order and economical prosperity to the 
country. Via such promises they may gain a greater support from the population, 
despite their actual agendas. The role of instability is to create the need and hope 
for a better option than the currently available.
2.3 The “Antidemocratic Personality”
There is,  in any society,  individuals  who favor and even support  authoritarian 
rule.  These people may take active  part  in the coup if  they somehow become 
convinced that the coup leader is a good leading figure, or may simply be more 
happy  with  an  undemocratic  system.  The  personality  type  that  enjoys 
authoritarian situations is often rigid and intolerant, prejudice and religiously strict 
(see Napier and Jost 2008, p. 598 and 611 for a more elaborate description of this 
personality type and its distinctive patterns). It is also strongly linked to low levels 
of education (ibid pp. 599-600). Interesting in the context is that in the 11 nations 
that went from free to partly free in the freedom house index between 1979 and 
2005  the  average  level  of  education  was  considerably  lower  than  the  world 
average, with 62% literate, compared to a world average of 70%4. 
The  broadening  of  ones  view  of  the  world  provided  by  education  can 
counteract  ethnocentrism  and  other  prejudice  often  found  in  authoritarian 
programs, but the psychological profile is more complicated than just education. 
The theory also stresses the importance of authoritarian child rearing, of the kind 
commonly  found  in  some  deeply  religious  and  third  world  cultures,  and  low 
socio-economic status (Napier and Jost 2008,   p. 600). 
Given that  most  of the factors,  if  not  all,  that  Napier  and Jost  point  to  as 
determinative  for  a  personality  that  supports  authoritarianism  are  present  in 
Africa, South Asia and to some extent South America it should not be surprising 
that coups more often occur and succeed in these areas. The presence of many 
individuals with an authoritarian personality in the population will unavoidably 
lead to a greater support and perhaps more importantly to less resistance to an 
authoritarian  takeover.  The  leaders  of  a  coup  meet  many  obstacles,  but  a 
population well drilled in the routines of having an authoritarian leadership is less 
likely to be one. There is some evidence pointing to the theory that in some parts 
of the world the population has a higher prevalence of people with this sort of 
personality due to some religious and cultural heritage.
4See Appendix 1 for statistical information concerning this and other variables in the relevant states.
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2.4 The Authoritarian Legacies of Religion and 
Culture
A major part in the life of every human being, and also a major part in developing 
an authoritarian personality, is the culture one was raised in, combined in many 
cases  with  a  religion  to  have  faith  in.  Most  of  the  major  religions  can  be 
considered  “puritan”,  or  “religions  of  restraint”,  as  Muslims,  Jews,  Catholic 
Christians,  Buddhists,  Confucianists  and  followers  of  any  other  reasonably 
“modern” religion follow a set of rules limiting their worldly pleasures and setting 
up a strict moral code of conduct. A part of religion is also often listening to the 
words and orders an authority, priests or similar spiritual leaders whose decrees 
are seldom questioned, this strict adherence to rules and authority sets its distinct 
marks in the way followers of these religions view authority. 
Milan  Zafirovski  claims  that  puritan  views  lead  to  an  authoritarian  legacy 
within the population which coup makers and authoritarian rulers can easily play 
on to win support (Zafirovski 2007, pp. 2-4). However there are many kinds of 
puritans,  in  many  aspects  of  society,  and  while  they  are  spread  in  nearly  all 
societies and religions not all societies have a majority large enough to change the 
overall outlook on authoritarian rule.
Zafirovski argues that in western societies such as the U.S.A the legacy of 
puritanism has worked in an authoritarian direction to increase the support for 
authoritarian style rule (ibid. pp. 249-251). In some cases the process towards a 
secular democracy is reversed in times of conservatism (ibid p. 258). If such links 
can be shown in countries that separated church and state centuries ago, it would 
not be unreasonable to say a similar link could be found in countries with an even 
greater portion of religious believers. This theory fails to explain the lack of coup 
attempts in other countries in which a large part of the population follows puritan 
religions,  such  as  Saudi  Arabia  or  the  U.S.A,  but  the  authoritarian  style  of 
leadership is there, suggesting perhaps that if a coup did occur it would be easier 
for the coup leaders to establish new authoritarian leadership. 
Cultural aspects in some parts of the world have a similar effect to religion, 
specifically in regions where the culture of warriors, tribes and the idea of revenge 
is strong military or even brutal leaderships are not necessarily seen as something 
aberrant (Clark 2007, pp. 141-142). In the South and West Asian region a well 
documented  Confucian-inspired  culture  of  submission  and  hierarchies,  albeit 
more  peaceful,  plays  a  similar  role  in  making  the  population  at  peace  with 
authoritarian forms of leadership and control. 
Naturally, the importance of any of these factors can also die out over time 
and through influence from other cultures or a loss of the grip of religion. This is 
shown  by  several  examples  where  countries  with  a  big  prevalence  of  coups 
suddenly  turned  towards  attempts  at  democracy  instead,  like  in  sub  Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s (ibid.). 
The factor  of an authoritarian  legacy in  the culture  and overall  population 
would  seem to  be  an  important  catalyst  in  connection  with  other  factors,  but 
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nonetheless  one  that  can  be  reformed  away  with  time  and  efforts  of 
democratization. Assuming that little attempts at reforming the traditional religion 
or  culture  are  made  authoritarian  rulers  can  undoubtedly  benefit  from  an 
authoritarian cultural legacy.
2.4.1 Post-Colonial Issues
While not all countries experiencing coups are former colonies many, especially 
in  Africa,  are.  One  of  the  most  widespread  theories  sees  the  reasons  for 
decolonisation as an economical matter, due to the colonial powers not having the 
financial situation needed to keep them by use of force any longer, leaving the 
administrations  to  inexperienced  locals  who  had  not  “proved  fit”  for  self-
government  (see  First  1970,  pp.  41-43).  Countries  such  as  Kenya  where  the 
independence was planned and timed by the British,  and in the former French 
colonies  of  northern  Africa,  there  was  much  less  coup  activity  in  the  years 
following independence than in other parts of the continent,  signifying that the 
means of decolonisation is a factor that should be considered (ibid pp. 46-48). 
In the former colonies where independence was gained extremely rapidly, by 
simple  acts  such  as  signing  a  constitution  and  running  a  national  flag  up  a 
flagpole, the message sent to the population and to the officers in the military 
controlling the means of force was that change of government is an easy, single 
and fast act, one undertaken after a struggle to rid the country of unwanted rulers 
(see First 1970, pp. 49-50). 
It is not hard to see the similarities between the rapid independence of the African 
colonies and the kind of transition seen in a coup situation. The sharp decline of 
coups in many parts of the world in the 1990s could be seen as a generation shift, 
with  other  more  democratic  influences  being consolidated  in  the minds  of the 
population and the leaders.
2.4.2 The Overrepresentation of Africa
In Africa during the first decades of independence from colonial rule, the 1960s 
through the 1980s, coups were abundant, and at times there were few democratic 
regimes in any given area. Within a period of 46 years there were 80 successful 
coups, 108 failed attempts and 139 reported plots to commit coups never carried 
out in 41 of the 48 independent sub Saharan African nations (McGowan 2003, 
p.339). Although there is doubt of the validity of many of the claims of coups, as 
they might have been made up as an excuse by the regime to eliminate political 
opponents.
The diagram  presented by McGowan shows that the majority of the coups 
took place in  the western and north-east  parts  of the continent,  proportionally 
higher frequency than any other part (2003, p. 356). By contrast the data shows 
that the central,  southern and Indian ocean parts of Africa have proportionally 
lower  frequency of  coups  than  what  would  be  expected  given  the  number  of 
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states.  As  McGowan  continues  to  explain,  there  is  no  single  reason  for  the 
absence of coup behaviour in these states, rather they all have their own specific 
factors preventing such behaviour, for example being preoccupied with civil war 
or having the safety of the government guaranteed by external forces such as ex-
colonisers (McGowan 2003 p. 356). 
In the regions of Africa with the majority of the coups, especially in the 1960's 
and  1970's,  we  find  major  instability  in  the  form  of  political  chaos  after 
decolonisation,  authoritarian  legacies  in  the form of  a  culture  that  stresses  the 
value of warriors and/or obedience,  all  of the factors seen as formative for an 
authoritarian personality, and last but not least a widespread poverty coupled by 
the corruption bringing the full circle to close again with instability and mistrust 
in the leadership. These parts of Africa would seem to be perfect places for a coup 
to  be  successful,  and  they  most  of  the  time  were,  giving  credibility  to  the 
aforementioned factors. Remaining are the factors which might drive soldiers and 
officers to attempt to seize power.
2.5 Incentives For Coups According to Game Theory 
2.5.1 The Filter of Plausibility
For anyone to start planning a coup seriously there first and foremost needs to be 
a possible reward of doing so, i.e. the prospect of taking over power in the country 
must seem to be within reach. If the plotters for any reason do not see the timing 
right the plan gets caught in a “filter of plausibility” and seems too far fetched to 
attempt to put into action. When this occurs the coup leaders may choose to wait 
for the proper  timing,  or themselves  try to create  a mood or a situation  more 
suitable  for  their  needs.  If  the  coup  plotters  see  a  very  widespread  negative 
opinion of the current leadership among the population, if they see themselves as 
very popular, or more realistically if they feel they have the superior force needed 
to brutally remove the current leaders from power the filter is passed and a coup 
will  be attempted  (see Sutter  2000, pp.208-214).  The coup leaders  are  for the 
same  reason  (weaknesses  of  the  current  state,  etc.)  not  expecting  the  risk  of 
punishment to be very high, they expect to succeed. But experience and history 
tells  us  they  sometimes  don't.  In  other  words  the  perceived,  not  actual, 
circumstances must show that there exists an equilibrium or an advantage in favor 
of the coup plotters for the coup to seem feasible and therefore for it to be rational 
to launch a coup attempt (ibid. p. 212). 
These conditions naturally occur more often in countries that are plagued by 
economical difficulties or ethnic splits, and where a new, often harsh, leadership 
is likely to be welcomed. There is also an increased likelihood when the country is 
unstable and divided in warring factions that the plotters of the coup are allied 
with one of the already fighting factions within the country, and can count on the 
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support of this group. However it is not always given that the plotters of a coup 
have the support of a majority of those who will partake in the coup itself, often 
the military where the hierarchical structure gives opportunity for lower ranking 
officers  and  sometimes  even  individual  soldiers  to  swear  their  allegiance  to 
someone other than a coup leader. Generally it can be said that before a coup few 
other  than  the  faithful  want  any part  of  the  plan,  but  after  success  is  evident 
everyone wants to join in, a tactic that evidently also eases personal responsibility 
should the coup fail (see First 1970 pp. 360-365).
2.5.2 Individual Incentives
Fitch  (1977)  explores  how individuals  within  an  army makes  the  decision  to 
support a coup or oppose it, giving their support to the standing leadership of the 
country, primarily by responding to 6 criteria as follows; Public opinion hostile to 
the  government,  Large  scale  public  disorders,  Private  political  opinion, 
Government  attractiveness  to  institutional  interests,  Level  of  perceived 
[communist or fascist] threat, and Proximity of a threatening election (p. 77-79). 
The source material used by Fitch is interviews with the officers partaking in the 
Ecuadorian  coups  of  1954-1966,  and  might  not  be  directly  transferable  to  all 
coups, especially coups after the full effects of globalisation came into effect with 
computerisation, but it does show that officers consider a wide variety of factors 
before they decide whose side to stand on in an impending coup attempt. 
Factors determining how many of the officers support the coup are important 
in determining if a coup is at all attempted, giving higher or lower incentives by 
form of expected success. The proportion of supporting officers and soldiers has 
major influence over the successfulness of the coup given that the officers and 
soldiers not taking part in the coup may later rebel against the coup leadership, as 
happened  on  many  occasions  in  the  past.  If  the  coup  leaders  know  that  the 
external conditions for getting support are not met they might, in much the same 
way as they may manipulate the population by for example spreading chaos, try to 
create such conditions by lies or exaggerations, or may choose to wait until more 
officers support them. 
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3 Overview of Some Selected Cases
In this section I will show how the factors presented in the previous chapter are 
present in a selection of coups, although some are more prominent than others I 
believe  that  all  are  present  to some degree not only in these cases,  but in all 
coups. The five factors are:  Low level of internationalisation and international 
interest,  Economical  instability  and  widespread  poverty,  often  coupled  with 
accusations  of  corruption,  a  rurally  or  raw  materials  based  production, 
Undereducated and largely illiterate population with a generally low status and 
ethnic  clashes between themselves,  Culturally and historically an authoritarian 
tradition, Incentives for the army or some other elite to attempt to seize power via 
a coup.
3.1 The Gambia 1994, Popularity Lasting to This Day
3.1.1 History and Background
In the 1980s this previously British colony was on the track towards moderate 
policies, democracy and adherence to human rights. However many believe this to 
have been a façade covering president Jawara's  authoritarian tendencies  (Saine 
2008, p. 61). A failed coup was staged in 1981 that further contributed to the 
raising opposition and instability in the country (ibid.). 
In 1994 a military coup lead by the current president,  then general,  Yahya 
Jammeh  the  elected  president  was  overthrown  and  all  political  activity  was 
banned. His leadership was later consolidated in several  elections, the latest  in 
2006, and very little seems to be done in ways of democratizing the country (ibid. 
p.  59).  In  the  2006  elections  Mr  Jammeh  and  his  ruling  party  defeated  two 
different parties in a comparably fair and free election (ibid.). 
Seine sees the coup as preceded by “the complacency of the ruling People’s 
Progressive Party and endemic corruption [...] These factors inspired deep-seated 
dissatisfaction  and  disillusionment  among  the  populace,  especially  its  young 
people, who became increasingly convinced that the solution to their problems 
could be found only outside the framework of [the previous] President Jawara's 
democracy” (Saine 2008 p.61). Here we have a democracy which was overthrown 
and  replaced  by  a  more  popular  authoritarian  rule  gaining  support  especially 
domestically but to some extent also internationally. 
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From this  the conclusion regarding the  attitude  in  the country towards Mr 
Jammeh is that he is, or at least at some point was, widely seen as a saviour from 
previous despair and hardships. 
3.1.2 Economy
As many as 75% of the population of The Gambia depends on agriculture for their 
livelihood, and the rest is mostly dependant on the tourist industry and foreign aid 
(CIA Factbook, The Gambia). In this kind of situation it becomes important to 
appease the foreign interests  of tourists and aid organisations by meeting their 
demands.  By meeting  every  demand  set  up  by  the  of  the  commonwealth  the 
supply of aid and tourism was “saved”, giving the president and his government a 
position as the “better option” within the country, leading in practice to a foreign 
legitimisation  of  the  regime  on  several  levels.  At  the  same  time  as  the 
international community does not wish to support an authoritarian president it is 
also in their best interests to provide humane situations and aid to the population. 
In the case of Gambia the lack of an effective opposition to support forces the aid 
agencies to economically legitimise the government of president Jammeh. 
With a GINI index value of 50 in  1998 the country is  more economically 
equal  than many in  the region,  but  still  with a  very large share (37%) of  the 
income going to  the 10 richest  percent  of  the population (CIA Factbook,  The 
Gambia). 
3.1.3 Geopolitical Context
There  has  been  little  international  attention  or  protests  directed  at  the  country.  The 
commonwealth, of which The Gambia is a member, has made a few official protests but 
overall the country has essentially been ignored on the international stage. Initially after 
the coup in 1994 a  wide condemnation  of the country from the west  and sanctions 
pending a change to democratic rule speeded up the transition from the initial military 
rule  to a civilian rule  by means of a  new constitution.  As soon as the transfer was 
complete, in 1996, elections were held, in which Mr Jammeh won 56% of the votes 
(Saine 2008 p. 62). This change meant that the tourist industry could make a comeback 
and an economical revival after two years, easing the strain on the population in a way 
that might have worked as a catalyst to an increasing popularity of the government as 
well  as  a  strong  legitimising  factor.  In  2001  further  pressures  led  to  the  ban  on 
formations of political parties being repealed, also further legitimising the win of the 
ruling party in the following elections (ibid.).
By taking measures that were clearly guided towards making the opposition 
beat  the  government  democratically  but  failing  in  doing  so  the  international 
community has instead helped the authoritarian leadership of president Jammeh to 
consolidate  and given  legitimacy to  his  role  as  a  saviour  of the economy and 
upholder of law and order to a significant part of the population.
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3.2 Ghana 1966, False Claims and Foreign Interests
3.2.1 History and Background
Ghana became the first independent former colony in sub-Saharan Africa in 1957. 
At the time of independence, as was custom in this part of the world at the time, 
few  of  its  resources  were  nationalised,  instead  belonging  to  British  colonial 
interests  and  foreign  companies.  The  president  since  independence,   Kwame 
Nkrumah, was heavily involved with dealings with the west, but with very little 
changes in policy being made and what many, both internationally and in Ghana 
itself, saw as an incompetent leadership (First 1970 p. 169).
When news of the coup were spread in February 1966 military officers and 
exiled citizens all over the continent and abroad started presenting themselves as 
masterminds  or  at  the  least  cooperatives  of  the  coup  ousting  the  unpopular 
Nkrumah from power (First 1970 pp. 363-366). The country was to be thrown 
into a  decades long struggle over who was to ultimately rule the country, ending 
in 1981 with a flight lieutenant by the name of Jerry Rawlings, ultimately banning 
political activity.
3.2.2 Economy
Ghana's economy always relied heavily on the export of expensive raw materials 
for the world market such as gold, diamonds and cocoa, these resources are traded 
for foreign financial and technical assistance on which the country depends (CIA 
Factbook, Ghana). Agriculture  is the dominant sector domestically and a large 
portion of the population works within the farming, plantation or mining industry, 
often with little or no education (ibid.). Having always been considered a poor 
country despite its natural resources and little profit from its resources came to the 
good of the people.  The ruling party for the first  10 years  of the independent 
nation  of  Ghana  made  no  changes  whatsoever  to  the  colonial  structures  of 
economy,  giving away all  revenues  to  foreigners.  During world war 2 Ghana, 
along with most west African colonies, had been tied to the allied economies, and 
thereby felt the full force of the eventual economic crash with a steep decline in 
the terms of trade and soaring prices due to shortages (see First 1970 p. 169). This 
downturn would last until the coup of 1966 when the new rulers started taking 
decisive and directed action towards reviving the economy, among other methods 
by recreating the export values of cocoa by a decrease in production (ibid.). This 
situation helped creating a “hero role” for the coup makers who in the eyes of the 
population  brought  back  power  and  property  values  to  the  people  with  much 
sought after international support. 
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3.2.3 Geopolitical Context
In the first year after the coup there was what many would see as a “swing to the 
west”  in  Ghanian  politics,  along  with  allegations  of  Western  powers  being 
accomplices in the coup, at the same time an English newspaper proclaimed that 
“Ghana would be worth salvaging again” (First 1970 p. 376). To those with a 
realistic (in IR theory use of the word) outlook this approach signifies that the 
west, or any nation for that matter, has no interest in a country that it cannot have 
any use of,  be it  militarily  or  as a  source of natural  resources.  Caught  in the 
middle of the power struggle of the cold war with “limited strategical importance” 
and as a former colonial power it was subject to pressure and arms deals with both 
the  west  and  the  soviets  and  strong economical  pressures  from the  American 
administration to “not take a path that is hostile to American interests” (ibid p. 
378-379).  
3.3 Ecuador 2000, Strong Population and Soft Army
3.3.1 History and Background
The history of Ecuador  since its  independence  from the Spanish kingdom has 
been volatile, with around 20 different constitutions (CIA Factbook Ecuador). In 
January 2000 indigenous people in Ecuador led a march into the capitol of Quito 
in order to overthrow the government of ruling president Jamil Mahuad, gaining 
the support  of the army under the explicit  condition that  labour  unions or the 
maoist-inspired socialist groupings were not involved (Walsh 2001 pp. 174-176, 
passim.). The breakthrough came when the indigenous protesters with the support 
of the army occupied the government headquarters on 21st January and demanded 
the resignation of the president, which was granted by the fleeing president (ibid 
p. 178-181). 
In the months following the coup many of the involved officers were jailed or 
prosecuted before an amnesty was granted in may (Walsh 2001 p. 201).
The  indigenous  population  in  Ecuador  is  traditionally  powerful  but 
disadvantaged (ibid p. 175). There is frequent attempts at coups in the country 
coupled with protests in the population that has lead to the resignation of the last 
three democratically elected presidents. Despite this the country is considered to 
be relatively stable compared to its neighbours, and has enjoyed long periods of 
unbroken civilian rule in the past, notably 21 years by the year of 2000. Unlike 
their counterparts in other Latin American countries the Ecuadorian armed forces 
have never had a reputation for violence or strong repression (ibid. 2001 p. 178). 
This might  have put them in a less feared position to excess control  over the 
population, and won them the trust of the people. 
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3.3.2 Economy
In 1999/2000, just before the coup, Ecuador suffered a severe economic crisis, 
with GDP contracted by more than 6%, with a significant increase in poverty, a 
collapse of the banking system, and failure to pay its external debt (CIA Factbook 
Ecuador). Unlike many poorer countries in the region Ecuador has large deposits 
of oil which makes up half of its export revenues, and a majority of the population 
works  in  the  service  and industrial  sectors,  many  of  them in  the  oil  industry 
(ibid.). The country has a GINI value of 46 (ibid). Oil provides a stability in the 
trade  balance,  due  to  the  fact  that  oil  is  normally  a  stable  and  profitable 
commodity and access to it normally allows countries to make more long term 
investments. The fact that the finances were so bad and poverty so widespread in 
1999  could  easily  have  been  seen  by  some  as  proof  of  the  president  and 
government lacking judgement, speeding up the loss of trust, the allegations of 
corruption and the protests from the native population.
3.3.3 Geopolitical Context
According to their own statements, the goal of the indigenous people was not to 
take  power,  but  rather  to  express  dissatisfaction  and  “confront  reality”,  while 
keeping  a  change  in  government  a  secondary  goal  (Walsh  2001 p.  193).  The 
military  however  used  this  support  and  the  created  instability  to  oust  a  very 
unpopular, publicly and militarily, leadership.  The Ecuadorian army must have 
had fresh in memory the defeats they suffered in the short border war with Peru in 
19955, a conflict that was only resolved two years before in the peace agreement 
of 1998, giving the officers taking part in the coup yet another strong reason to 
oppose the president who signed the treaty. 
Given the situation of a displeased population the military might have seen it 
appropriate to make the choice of stepping in as a “saviour” force to take over and 
create a new, hopefully more popular, order. 
5Also called the Cenapa War
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3.4 Thailand 1991, Coups Under the Great King
3.4.1 History and Background
Thailand is an interesting example due to its constitutional monarchy, with king 
Bhumibol having extensive powers and being recognised as the Head of State, the 
Head  of  the  Armed  Forces,  the  Upholder  of  the  Buddhist  Religion,  and  the 
Upholder of All Religions. He has also initiated and maintains a great number of 
popular projects in his name6, and seemingly enjoys a massive amount of support 
and respect amongst the population. In practice this means that the leaders of any 
coup must have the approval of the king for the new rule, as happened in 1991 
when the king was presented with a choice of four candidates for premiership, 
picked by the leaders of the junta which had taken over, and chose one to rule 
(Christensen 1991 p. 95). Though the military rule lasted for only slightly longer 
than a year before the junta was forced from power in early 1992 there has been 
several coups and attempts in the country both before and since and I believe this 
to be an interesting example of coups under a higher power (the king), with the 
added factor of popular support from the population..
Thailand had previously been the scene of failed coup attempts in 1981 and 
1985 which  failed  to  attract  the  support  of  most  military  officers  (ibid).   As 
recently  as  in  2006 and  latest  in  November  2008 royalist  protests  erupted  in 
Bangkok demanding a military coup removing the elected government  for the 
benefit of a more royalist rule. The outcome of this latest conflict is still unknown 
at the writing of this thesis, but the large public support for the king and for a coup 
ousting  an  elected  leader  shows  what  most  would  agree  is  an  authoritarian 
preference in a large part of the population. Some scholars indeed argue that the 
spirit of the Thai culture and values is incompatible with a western style electoral 
democracy,  much like many neighbouring countries in the region (Christensen 
1991  p.  97).  As  we  have  seen  in  chapter  2.4  this  sort  of  argument  is  not 
uncommon  amongst  those  supporting  more  authoritarian  style  systems,  and  is 
commonly found with similar connotations in debates about for example Islam. 
It  would  seem that  Thailand  makes  the  ideal  example  of  a  state  where  a 
majority of the population is of an authoritarian personality type.  They see no 
problem with having an extremely popular king ruling over the country instead of 
an elected leader,  and are willing to support,  even demand, a military coup to 
restore their preferred order. 
6 See http://kanchanapisek.or.th/projects/index.en.html for an extensive list of projects and titles  (20081121)
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3.4.2 Economy
Thailand  is,  unlike  most  African  or  Latin  American  countries,  relatively 
prosperous and well developed with a working infrastructure and reasonably high 
growth  (CIA  Factbook,  Thailand).  The  country  has  a  GINI  index  of  42  and 
depends to a large part of tourism and services, although the major part of the 
population is occupied in the agricultural sector (ibid.). This gives a dispersion 
between the population in the cities of this relatively modern country working 
with  foreigners  daily,  giving  them  the  language  skills  needed  to  understand 
foreign media and a wage,  and those in the rural  areas with little  income and 
education and little free time to spend on learning. It is this rift in the population 
that is the main cause of the clashes between the (mostly urbanely based “elite”) 
traditional  royalists  and  the  “democrats”  of  the  rural  areas  supporting  the 
authoritarian-modernising  politics  of  the  prime  minister.  Both  factions  are 
supporting authoritarian means (due to a common antidemocratic personality), but 
in differing aspects due to their different economic situations. 
3.4.3 Geopolitical Context
The fact  that  Thailand has never been colonised by any foreign power further 
supports the theory that it is the authoritarian preferences of the population and 
the generally extensive trust in the army which gives the foundation to so many 
successful coups.  Since the country relies on its tourist industry for a large part of 
the national income (CIA Factbook, Thailand) it becomes important to maintain a 
public image of a stable “paradise” internationally,  leading to the political  and 
rhetorical inclusion of foreign citizens in a way the nations of Africa or South 
America never do, as these countries rely on export and not physical travel, while 
most  people  might  be  prepared  to  buy  coffee  or  gold  that  comes  from  a 
dictatorship,  few are  willing  to  travel  there  if  they  believe  themselves  to  risk 
oppression or violence, one example being the lack of extensive tourism to Saudi 
Arabia7. 
7The income from tourism in the state revenues of Saudi Arabia are negligible according to official statistics 
found at http://www.saudiembassy.net/ (20081208)
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4 Conclusions
Coup attempts are highly unlikely to succeed unless they are met by support in 
some form, either from the population or from a stronger foreign power on par 
with the superpowers of the cold war. Domestic support is formed where many 
citizens with an already culturally formed antidemocratic personality are affected 
by  economical  hardships,  perceived  unfair  treatment  by  their  government  and 
isolation from democratic influences from the rest of the world. When the stability 
of such a country dissolves into instability due to for example ethnic clashes, the 
death of a previous strong leader, decolonisation,  widespread corruption, unfair 
conditions for the population or any other releasing factor the people will crave 
for  change.  The  difference  between  the  countries  where  a  popular  revolution 
forms and those where coups are  supported is  that  a population  with a strong 
antidemocratic personality and a preference for an authoritarian rule will choose 
the option of supporting a change by proxy, enacted by the physically stronger and 
thereby often culturally admired warriors of the army, as opposed to themselves 
attempting a revolution like the ones seen in many western societies. 
Coup  attempts  occur  at  the  time  where  the  leaders  of  the  coup  see  an 
opportunity where it is plausible that they can establish a new rule, this “filter of 
plausibility” means that many plots are never carried out, while others are found 
out by the current rulers and stopped. If a plot is carried out while the population 
is displeased with the previous rule  and not preferring a democratically elected 
leadership over the undemocratic capture of power the population will give their 
moral and sometimes physical support to the coup and thereby help it succeed. 
Conversely, if the population in general have a democratically minded personality 
or if  they are  pleased with their  current  situation  and government  the coup is 
likely to gain little support or to be opposed until it falls to a more popular counter 
coup or to demands of elections. The support gained is often also maintained until 
the population grows displeased at their conditions worsening or not improving, 
which in turn lays the foundation for a new coup later on in time. This pattern 
may continue for decades until  the population becomes democratically minded 
through  outside  (western)  influence,  a  development  which  often  requires 
extensive  urbanisation  and  improvement  of  the  technological  and  educational 
standards. 
International support for coups, which may lead to an interference that affects 
the outcome, grows out of the self interest of the country to maintain a supply 
route or change power relations in favor of their own preferred system, which is 
also  the  reason for  modern  day  condemnation  of  practically  all  coups  on  the 
grounds of being “undemocratic” and therefore wrong.  
These results are supported by the presented cases as described below.
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4.1Common Features in the Cases
4.1.1 Authoritarian Traditions and Domestic Support
Some of the cases have been colonized by other nations in the past, while some, 
like Thailand, have never had any foreign ruler. This gives the simple conclusion 
that a colonial past is not a major factor in determining the chances of a successful 
coup, or even the attempt of one, however the past  administrations might be an 
important factor to consider, as is the tradition of the surrounding area and the 
countries that has traditionally influenced the policies of the country.
In the case of  Thailand the previous  system before constitutional  rule  was 
adapted in 1932 was absolute monarchical  rule, Gambia and Ghana were both 
ruled by similar  styles of kingdoms before they came under colonial  rule, and 
Ecuador had been under a long and authoritarian rule of the Spanish king since the 
early 16th century before independence. 
The factor of a long term authoritarian rule is also in all cases combined with 
cultural  factors  encouraging obedience,  such as the often violent  child  rearing 
with a strong prevalence of corporal punishment seen in Ghana8, Ecuador9, The 
Gambia10 and Thailand11 alike (see list at The United Nations Initiative to End 
Corporal Punishment of Children). A larger statistical comparison shows similar 
results (see appendix 1). This would, according to the theories of Napier and Jost 
(2008) put the the majority of the population in these countries in the possibility 
of developing an authoritarian personality type. Judging by the apparent lack of 
resistance, even signs of support, in these countries I find this to be one of the 
plausible factors. It should be noted here that many states that practice corporal 
punishment  have not had any coups, but I feel  it  is important to stress it  as a 
contributing factor  to  the  mentality  that  facilitates  support  for  coups,  not a 
decisive factor.
8See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Ghana at 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/ac4310078407480cc1257101003e15f7/$FIL
E/G0640110.DOC(20081212) & 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRGHStakeholdersInfoS2.aspx   (20081212)
9See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Ecuador at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/CRC.C.SR.481.En?Opendocument (20081212)& 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPREcuadorStakeholderInfoS1.aspx (20081212)
10See united nations reports for corporal punishment in The Gambia at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/CRC.C.SR.740.En?Opendocument (20081212)
11See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Thailand at 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/54c00eda0882cbf0c125722d002c60c9/$FIL
E/G0645200.doc (20081212)& http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6f6879be758d0e8ec12570d9003340ba/
$FILE/G0544374.pdf (20081212)
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4.1.2 Unrest in the Region and In the Population
Ecuador is a case of a weak and under-equipped army having difficulties staging a 
coup on their own. In these cases it is crucial to have a dissatisfied population 
willing to lend their moral and sometimes direct physical support, for example in 
the form of mass gatherings and protests. Ecuador has a tradition of communal 
uprising, and in the event of a coup being initiated and carried out by the military 
the strong community was willing and able to step in to change the outcome to 
their preference in cooperation with the army itself,  who agreed without force. 
This  builds  on what  can only be a  self  image in  the population  that  they are 
stronger than the army, a factor that seems dearly lacking in most countries with 
successful coups.
Ghana and Gambia have long been politically unstable countries for a variety 
of  reasons,  most  prominently  as  a  reaction  the  widespread poverty and unfair 
distribution of the income from exports, as well as power struggles within an elite 
leading to suffering in the population overall. This in turn leads to a desire for 
change, which can manifest itself as support for coup leaders.
In  Thailand the unrest  is  both dampened and exaggerated  by the powerful 
king, whose powers have been a matter of dispute but acknowledged  by all prime 
ministers  and  other  rulers  over  the  years.  Outside  the  subject  of  royalty  the 
conflicts in Thai politics also revolve around corruption and power struggle, with 
large and sometimes violent protests being the result.
4.1.3 Ethnic Heterogeneity
In  many  situations  a  very  ethnically,  culturally  or  religiously  heterogeneous 
population can lead to internal clashes of the type seen in India between Hindus 
and Muslims,  or the overstated example of Rwanda.  In Gambia12 and Ghana13 
different  ethnic  groups  have  had  sporadic  clashes  over  leadership  since  their 
respective years of independence, Ecuador has experienced much tension between 
the native indian population and the more recently arrived Spanish Europeans and 
immigrants14,  and  in  Thailand  Muslim  separatists  have  attacked  the  Buddhist 
majority along with clashes between tribes in the north-eastern areas15. In general 
the evidence of ethnic heterogeneity being a catalyst for unrest and for the need of 
a strong leader to unite the factions is strengthened by these examples.
12http://allafrica.com/stories/200112040617.html   (20081220)
13http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1690746.stm   and http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes 
(20081220)
14See Walsh 2001 
15http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/assam-to-seek-cbi-probe-into-ethnic-clashes_100106152.html   
(20081220)
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4.1.4 Poor Economic Situation
The presented cases, with the possible exception of Thailand, share a very poor 
economical situation with most states experiencing successful coups. Exports, of 
raw materials  in  the  African  and  South  American  cases  and  of  manufactured 
goods in the case of Thailand, are high and the profit rates or terms of trade low. 
Thailand an exception from the agricultural average with their large tourism 
industry,  giving profits  but  at  unstable  rates,  although most  of  the rest  of  the 
population  are  in  the  agricultural  production.  The  instability  of  incomes  from 
tourism  means  that  the  country  has  a  low  security  of  income,  meaning  less 
resources for long term projects and a poorly maintained infrastructure. 
4.2 The Factors and Their Impact
While some coups are still  after the end of the cold war directly supported by 
foreign  powers  to  forward  their  own  interests,  most  modern  day  coups  are 
condemned by an international community that heavily favours democracy as the 
“right” from of rule. This condemnation and subsequent embargoes and blockades 
intertwine with the fact that nearly all countries that experience coup attempts are 
poor and rely on export for income to become a very, if not the most, important 
tool to deter from coups that the international community has at hand. However 
there are many, many examples, the latest being Guinea, that coup makers ignore 
this and persist in their attempts, often under the excuse of trying to make the 
situation better  for the population,  thereby discarding the foreign arguments as 
wrongful and unfounded.. The important impact of sanctions lies in the population 
who suffer shortages and other hardships, which may further increase the support 
for the coup makers. 
A population  which can easily be convinced of the superiority of the new 
leadership,  due  to  being  poorly  informed  and/or  already  convinced  that 
authoritarianism is a viable way of change for the better, will abstain from any 
expressions of opposition that might foil the coup. An authoritarian personality 
created  by  the  individual  religious  beliefs,  cultural  patterns  and  exposure  to 
hierarchical  or violent  orders in  the childhood also plays  an important  part  in 
determining if a person actively opposes an authoritarian rule, or simply ignore it 
or even decides to support it. If the individual is at the same time disadvantaged 
by a bad economical situation, widespread poverty, unfair treatment, corruption 
on part of the previous administration or a lack of education that gives access to 
independent information there is a major chance that he or she will  choose to 
welcome the new administration regardless of the means by which it took office. 
The most important of the factors remains the traditions and culture of the 
country, it is the most important factor in creating an antidemocratic personality 
and it is the most resistant to change of the factors. Where an authoritarian culture 
is present the population are just a personal crisis and a promising strong leader 
away from cheering a new dictator. 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Comparison 
Between States With Successful Coups and 
World Averages
Method and Selection of Cases
The statistics in this appendix are, unless any other source is given, taken from the 
database “länder06” administered by Docent Leif Johansson at the Department for 
Political  Science  at  Lund  University.  The  data  has  been  processed  using  the 
statistics program SPSS. 
“All States” includes the 190 states acknowledged by the United Nations in 
2006. The 16 cases under “States With Successful Coups” include those coups 
that have led directly to an authoritarian rule, they do not include failed coups, the 
successful  coups  that  were  quickly  and  peacefully  replaced  by democratically 
approved governments (such as in France 1958 or frequently in Turkey) nor does 
it  include  those who led directly  to democratic  and non-authoritarian  regimes, 
such as in the cases where dictators were ousted. 
Due to a lack of reliable statistics older than 30 years I have unfortunately 
only been able to include coups taking place after 1970, forcing me to bypass 
some of  the more  interesting  cases and admittedly limiting  the validity  of  the 
statistical study. See chapter 1 for further specification. 
The  variables  used  are  indicative  of  the  economical,  geopolitical,  and 
historically shaping aspects of a country, as well as some indicators of the factors 
for the “antidemocratic personality” discussed in chapters 2.3 and 2.4. To be able 
to assess the situation as close to the coup as possible the cases with coups will be 
grouped according to decades (1970's, 1980's etc.) and the data closest to this date 
will be chosen, or an average if there are several data points in the decade. In the 
case of coups in several different decades the latest coup For the non-coup cases 
and the world averages average values of all data points are used. 
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List of the States With Successful Coups Included
Year of coup in parenthesis.
Group 1.
Uganda (1971)
Chile (1973)
Rwanda (1973)
Chad (1975)
Argentina (1976)
Ecuador (1976)
Ethiopia (1977)
Mauritania (1978)
Comoros (1978)
Group 2.
Suriname (1980)
Bolivia (1980)
Liberia (1980)
Nigeria (1983)
Group 3.
Trinidad & Tobago (1990)
Thailand (1991)
Gambia (1994)
Ivory Coast (1999)
Prevalence of Corporal Punishment
Of the 23 countries which have totally banned corporal punishment none had any 
coups after  the  ban,  and  only one,  Venezuela,  had  ever  had  successful  coups 
before the ban. Consequently, of the above mentioned states none had a ban on 
corporal punishment both at home and in school or other institutions16. 
Statistical Averages For States With Successful Coups
Economy
• GDP growth 1960-1995 (All groups): 1.1%
• Yearly inflation rate 1980-1993 (Group 2+3):  35%
• Military spending in % of GDP 1981 (2+3): 2.6%
• Workforce in agricultural sector 1980 (2+3): 52%
16The United Nations Initiative to End Corporal Punishment of Children 
http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/pdfs/charts/Chart-Global.pdf   (20081212)
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Dependence on the International Community
• Globalisation index 1-10: 1975 (All groups): 1.6, 1990 (group 3): 1.5
• Foreign direct investments in % of GDP: 1980 (Group 2+3): 0.8%, 1990 (Group 
3): 1.4%
• Amount of GDP that consists of export + import: 1980 (Group 2+3): 81%, 1990 
(Group 3): 85%
• Foreign aid in % of GDP: 1960 (all): 2.6%, 1980 (2+3): 6%
Education and the Conditions of the Population
• Human  development  index  0-1000  (according  to  “Human  development  
report”): 1980 (2+3): 547, 1990 (3): 636
• Respect for human rights index 0-100 (according to “Humana”): 1991 (3): 74
• Percentage  literate  of  the  adult  population: 1960  (All  groups):  33%,  1985 
(2+3): 70%, 1995 (3): 63%
• Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants: 1974 (All groups): 40, 1980 (2+3): 66, 1992 
(3): 55
• Technology index 0-100: 1970 (All groups): 37, 1980 (2+3): 48, 1990 (3): 58
• Population in urban areas: 1960 (all): 25.8%, 1980 (2+3): 37.4%
Factors for Instability, Ethnic and Religious Variables
• Ethnic Fragmentation Index 0-100 (all): 60.7
• Religious Fragmentation Index 0-100 (all): 43.5
Statistical Averages For All States 
Economy
• GDP growth 1960-1995: 1.1%
• Yearly inflation rate 1980-1993: 27.5% 
• Military spending in % of GDP 1981: 4.1%
• Workforce in agricultural sector 1980: 45.4%
Dependence on the International Community
• Globalisation index 1-10: 1975: 2.3, 1990: 2.2
• Foreign direct investments in % of GDP: 1980: 1.1%, 1990: 1.7%
• Amount of GDP that consists of export + import: 1980: 80%, 1990: 75%
• Foreign aid in % of GDP: 1960: 21.7%, 1980: 8.2%
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Education and the Conditions of the Population
• Human development index 0-1000 (according to “Human development report”)  
2003: 1980: 629, 1990: 664
• Respect  for  human rights  index  0-100 (according  to  “Humana”): 1983:  65, 
1991: 64
• Percentage literate of the adult population: 1960: 60%, 1985: 75%, 1995: 74%
• Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants: 1974: 109, 1980: 101, 1992: 115
• Technology index 0-100: 1970: 54, 1980: 59, 1990: 61
• Population in urban areas: 1960: 34.3%, 1980: 45%
Factors for Instability, Ethnic and Religious Variables
•  Ethnic fragmentation index: 43.8
• Religious fragmentation index: 43.9
Significant Differences
From these statistics it is easy to draw the conclusion that the population in states 
with successful coups undoubtedly face many severe problems in their everyday 
life,  amongst  the most  important  are  lower levels  of literacy and education,  a 
higher  ethnic  fragmentation,  low urbanisation  with  an  economy dependant  on 
agriculture,  low access  to  modern  technology and information,  and  an overall 
lower dependence on and interaction with foreign nations.
As previously mentioned the factors leading to an antidemocratic personality 
are intimately combined with prejudice and low socio-economic status. Corporal 
punishment, another factor linked to the antidemocratic personality type and is an 
indicator  of  pre-existing  authoritarian  structures,  is  also  more  common  in 
countries  with  coups.  Prejudice  comes,  according  to  many  scholars  including 
Napier and Jost, from a lack of education and knowledge of other cultures and 
customs, and in the international  perspective the population of these countries, 
with  the  exception  of  the  leaders  themselves,  are  at  the  very  lowest  of  the 
(international) socio-economic scale, and with a majority of the population on the 
low side of the (national domestic) scale. The statistics thereby confirm that in the 
countries where successful coups take place there is a bigger prevalence of the 
factors leading to the kind of situation where citizens do not protest against and in 
many cases support authoritarian rule. 
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Appendix 2: Application on a Fresh Case; 
Guinea
The Coup Attempt
After the death of Mr Conte on the night of the 22nd December 2008 the military 
almost immediately attempted to seize power17 18. Foreign reactions were negative 
with  The  African  Union,  European  Union,  United  States  and  former  colonial 
power  France  all  condemning  the  attempted  coup19,  however  a  portion  of  the 
guinean people seem to support the coup as there has been reports of “thousands” 
of supporters taking to the streets to greet the coup leader20. President Conte was 
by some, internationally and in recent native comments, seen as a dictator, but still 
managed  to  win  a  row of  elections  and  popular  votes  to  stay  in  power.  The 
fairness  of  these  elections  remains  disputed  and  heavy irregularities  has  been 
reported (CIA Factbook, Guinea). 
On the 25th of December the prime minister and other ministers were reported 
to have submitted to the coup makers, thereby consolidating the new  rule, which 
is supposed to last until new elections are held “within two years”, breaking the 
rules  of  the  constitution  saying  elections  should  be  held  within  60  days21 22. 
Whether  or not this  coup was to  lead to an authoritarian rule or not  was still 
unclear at the completion of this thesis, but it seemingly bears many of the signs 
pointing towards a possibility of such a rule.
The Factors and How They Manifest Themselves23
• Guinea is a country with major supplies of natural resources (bauxite), although 
most of the population lives on less than 1 dollar per day, the limit for extreme 
poverty, agriculture and the bauxite mining industry makes up the main part of 
the  countries  production  (CIA  Factbook  Guinea).  The  population  has  an 
extremely low literacy rate of 29.5%.
17http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796902.stm   (20081225)
18http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796741.stm   (20081225)
19http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7798876.stm   (20081225)
20http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799279.stm   (20081225)
21http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799548.stm   (20081225)
22http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799888.stm   (20081226)
23All numbers and percentages in this section are taken from the CIA Factbook article on Guinea (20081225)
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• Ethnically  the  country is  divided  between the  favoured  (by Comte)  Soussou 
minority (20%) and the larger groups of Peul (40%) and Malinke (30%), ethnic 
tensions are feared when there no longer is the repressive power of the president 
to force peace between the groups24. 
• The  majority,  85% of  the  population,  are  Muslims,  which  according  to  the 
theories of Napier&Jost and Zafirovski is a religion which opens the population 
to an authoritarian personality.
• The  country  has  achieved  a  nationalized  industry  of  bauxite  production, 
lessening  the  dependence  on  foreign  investors.  After  the  long  and  widely 
condemned  rule  of  president  Conte  there  is  little  international  respect  and 
support left to lose, and many would say the country is already an outsider on 
the international arena, with few diplomatic contacts. 
• The stability of the country was for 24 years guaranteed by the hard-handed rule 
of the previous president, discouraging coup attempts during his rule. 
• In the official statement of the coup plotters25 they addressed the problems of the 
country by promising “To fight corruption, To restore state authority and public 
administration,  To ensure the actual liberalisation of airwaves throughout the 
national  territory,  To  initiate  a  constitutional  amendment,  To  provide  basic 
services of water, electricity, and health care to the people.”. 
Conclusion
The recent case of the coup in Guinea exhibits all factors that have been presented 
in this thesis, and supports the conclusion that support for a coup is formed in the 
occasions where the population believes themselves to be better off with a new 
rule, regardless of its disposition or means of seizing power. Democratic elections 
or left-right scale positioning means little or nothing compared to the change this 
coup appears to represent to a population tired of the old rule, and so the coup 
seems to have good chances of succeeding in creating a new leadership if not the 
pressures from the international community to hold earlier elections become too 
strong.
24http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7798876.stm   (20081225)
25See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7797629.stm (20081225)
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